US–China Competition

Session 14 · Mon, Nov 9

POLISCI 158 · AI & Politics · Stanford · Fall 2026

Roadmap

  1. In this session
  2. Questions we’ll tackle
  3. Before class
  4. After class

In this session

Washington and Beijing both talk about AI as a race. We use the security dilemma from international relations to ask why, and what each side thinks the prize is: a decisive lead for whoever reaches AGI first, or the slower work of spreading AI through the whole economy. We then read a scoreboard on which the United States leads some measures and China others, and see that who is winning depends on which race you think it is. Last, we look at the main US lever, export controls on advanced chips, why it leaks, and the chokepoints China holds in return.

Questions we’ll tackle

  • Why do states frame AI as a race, and what does the security dilemma explain about it?
  • Is the prize being first to AGI, or adopting AI across the economy over decades?
  • Where does the United States lead, where does China lead, and who is winning under each definition of the race?
  • How do export controls turn compute into a chokepoint, how do chips leak through smuggling, remote access, distillation, espionage and stockpiling, and what levers does China pull back?

Before class

Read

Explore

After class

Key takeaways

  • States frame AI as a race because of the security dilemma: in a system with no authority above states, one side’s buildup reads as a threat to the other. What is at stake depends on the prize: a decisive, self-reinforcing lead for whoever reaches AGI first, or power that comes from diffusing a general-purpose technology through the economy over decades.
  • The scoreboard is split. The United States leads on compute, chips, private investment and frontier models; China leads on open-model downloads, industrial robots, electricity and patent counts. Who is winning depends on which race one thinks it is.
  • The main US lever is compute as a chokepoint, a case of weaponized interdependence. It leaks through smuggling, remote access, distillation, espionage and stockpiling, and China has chokepoints of its own, such as rare earths, that it can use in return.

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About this deck

Adapted from POLISCI 157 Session 7A (Aug 3, 2026) for the international-relations primer; the scoreboard, chips and export controls are new for 158.

Curated by Simone Paci, Stanford University. Drafted with AI assistance (Claude) from the instructor’s course materials and reviewed by the instructor before publication; every external link is checked before each update.