POLISCI 158 · AI & Politics · Session 14 · Monday, November 9, 2026
Ahead at what?
33% not sure
Pew Research Center, survey June 22–28, 2026 (n = 3,488)
69% keeping up w/ China in AI = important very 40 · somewhat 29
81% safety > staying at forefront of innovation innovation: 14
65% hold both views
2 separate questions · safety item doesn’t mention China
Quinnipiac University Poll, Sep 24–27, 2026 (n = 1,202, ±3.5)
Last week the compute had an address. This week it has a flag.
−17% ≈$593B one day
DeepSeek-R1 out: Jan 20, 2025
Mon, Jan 27: Nvidia −17% in 1 day, ~$593B market value
“DeepSeek-R1 is AI’s Sputnik moment.” Marc Andreessen (VC)
$589–600B, by data vendor
DeepSeek release note, Jan 20, 2025; Reuters/LSEG, Jan 28, 2025; Fortune, Jan 27, 2025
Waltz: 3 images of the causes of war
Waltz, Man, the State, and War (1959; Columbia UP, 2018 ed.)
“Many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.” Jervis (1978)
Jervis (1978), World Politics, p. 169, as quoted in Scharre (2021)
| Realism | Liberalism |
|---|---|
| Relative gains: your gain = my loss | Absolute gains: both can gain |
| Security first · balance of power | Trade, research, institutions, interdependence |
Which does AI look like?
Constructivism: race framing -> state behavior
What counts as threat -> depends on regime
“…not only Chinese anxiety over losing ground … but also concerns about threats to ideological and regime security.” Zeng (2025), abstract, on China’s reaction to ChatGPT
Zeng: security dilemma · constructivist reading = ours
Zeng, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Nov 5, 2025
“There is no AI arms race.”
But belief in one -> “cut corners on testing” -> “unsafe AI systems”
2021 · military AI · pre-ChatGPT
Scharre, Texas National Security Review, Summer 2021
“The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence.” AI Action Plan, July 2025
“Superintelligence will give a decisive economic and military advantage.” Aschenbrenner, 2024
“A temporary lead could be parlayed into a durable advantage.” Dario Amodei (Anthropic CEO), Jan 2025
Aschenbrenner: self-published · Amodei: AI CEO, stake in chip policy
White House, Jul 2025; Aschenbrenner, Situational Awareness, Jun 2024; Amodei, “On DeepSeek and Export Controls,” Jan 2025
Power = spreading a general-purpose tech across the economy
N&K: generalize from past tech · institute essay, not peer-reviewed
Ding, RAND, Sep 30, 2025, and Technology and the Rise of Great Powers (2024); Narayanan and Kapoor, Knight Institute, Apr 2025
| Leads leak | Complexity protects leaders |
|---|---|
| “AI knowledge is leaky.” “There is no finish line.” (Arbel and Tokson 2026) | Complexity -> weapons hard to imitate, even w/ stolen designs: China vs US stealth fighters (Gilli and Gilli 2019) |
Frontier AI: paper or stealth fighter?
Gilli & Gilli: weapons, not AI · Arbel & Tokson: EUV + stealth leads lasted decades
Arbel and Tokson, Lawfare, May 19, 2026; Gilli and Gilli, International Security, 2019
| Racing causes risk | A lead makes safety affordable |
|---|---|
| Racing -> “skimping on safety precautions” (Armstrong, Bostrom and Shulman 2016) | “Maintaining a healthy lead will be decisive for safety” (Aschenbrenner 2024) |
| Superintelligence race -> great-power conflict, loss of control, weaker liberal democracy (Katzke and Futerman 2024) |
Katzke & Futerman, Aschenbrenner: not peer-reviewed
Armstrong et al., AI & Society, 2016; Katzke and Futerman, arXiv, Dec 2024; Aschenbrenner, Jun 2024
Mutual Assured AI Malfunction: bid for AI dominance -> “preventive sabotage by rivals”
Working paper, not peer-reviewed
Hendrycks, Schmidt and Wang, “Superintelligence Strategy,” arXiv, Mar 2025
If the prize differs, so does the scoreboard.
New AI compute, H1 2026: 78% -> US
Installed GPU-cluster perf., May 2025: US ~75% · China 15%
Customs-data estimates (arrivals ≠ use) · cluster data ≈ 10–20% of global compute
Epoch AI, Oct 27, 2026 and Jun 5, 2025
Private AI investment, 2025
Private investment only; understates China’s state guidance funds.
Stanford HAI, AI Index 2026
Since 2023: every frontier model American · China ~7 mo behind on avg (4–14)
One benchmark composite (Epoch Capabilities Index) · data to Dec 2025
Epoch AI, Jan 2, 2026
Huawei 2026 AI chip output: < 4% of Nvidia’s compute
Huawei chips 3–4 yrs behind Nvidia, until ≥ 2030
Epoch estimates · China’s own advanced lithography: likely after 2030
Epoch AI, Sep 2026
Near parity
Arena = crowd votes on model pairs, not benchmarks · same period as slide 20, different verdict
Stanford HAI, AI Index 2026 (Arena data)
Chinese models: 41% of Hugging Face downloads (Feb 2025–Feb 2026) -> largest share
Qwen, Jan–Jul 2026: ~2.05B downloads · 151,448 derivative models
Misses API + private use · ~half: no clear country · newest large Kimi/Qwen: licence limits
Hugging Face, Mar 17 and Aug 14, 2026
Viral claim: Chinese models = “61% of total token consumption on OpenRouter”
Top ten only
Top-10 leaderboard, week of Mar 1, 2026
All models
Token Share by Source Type and Origin, all models, weekly
OpenRouter = small, developer-heavy slice of AI use
Ding, ChinAI, Mar 2, 2026; a16z and OpenRouter, “State of AI,” Dec 2025
China: 59% of world’s new industrial robots, 2025
1-year installations, not robot stock
IFR, World Robotics 2026, Sep 24, 2026
Chinese vendors: over 95% of ~25,000 humanoids shipped, H1 2026
69% -> research/education, display, govt data-collection centres (83.8% in 2025)
Trackers disagree on total · 69%: global or China only? IDC doesn’t say
IDC, Sep 29, 2026
Solar added in 2025: China 378 GW, 58% of the world
Electricity demand growth, 2025: China +5%, US +3%
Solar in GW (DC).
Ember, Global Electricity Review 2026, Apr 21, 2026
Data center cost/MW: ~$6M China vs ~$10M US
Compute per $: US ahead in both modelled scenarios · H200s close raw-performance gap
One modelled 400 MW build, single source · hardware prices not public
Zakaria, ChinaTalk, Feb 19, 2026
GenAI patent families, 2014–2023: China 38,210 vs US 6,276
US leads on higher-impact patents
Quantity ≠ quality · by inventor location
WIPO, Jul 3, 2024; Stanford HAI, AI Index 2026
NeurIPS authors by work location, 2022 → 2025: US 46% → 34% · China 27% → 41%
n = 10,280 complete profiles of 25,677
40% subset w/ full career histories, not random · US still net gainer, keeps 89%
Ma and Yang, Carnegie Endowment, Sep 23, 2026
“AI+” plan, Aug 26, 2025
Also: “enhance the fundamental capabilities of models” · no AGI target
State Council (2025), CSET translation, Sep 24, 2025
“Just like we won the space race … win this race.” AI Action Plan, July 2025
Sep 29, 2026: executive order renames AI “Super Intelligence” · WH fact sheet: winning “the SI race”
“SI” = new name for AI, existing legal definition, not superintelligence
White House, Jul 2025; Executive Order 14434 and fact sheet, Sep 29, 2026
“Persist in Being Self-Reliant, Be Strongly Oriented Toward Applications…” (title of the readout)
State-media readout, not transcript · no AGI mention
Xinhua readout of the Politburo study session, Apr 26, 2025; CSET translation
Several analysts: no
“Beijing seems not to care about the so-called ‘race to AGI’.” Kyle Chan
“They aren’t trying to build AGI. They’re trying to make a profit.” Selena Xu
Some founders: yes
“Our destination is AGI.” Liang Wenfeng, DeepSeek
Liang, 2024 interview, as quoted by Chan
Chan, High Capacity, Feb 15, 2026; Sheehan and Xu, Your Undivided Attention, Dec 18, 2025
“AGI is now written into China’s operating system for modernization.” Matthew Johnson
Partly translation: 通用人工智能 = “general-purpose AI” or “AGI”
Johnson, Jamestown China Brief, Oct 2025; Beijing municipal government, May 2023; Shanghai SHEITC, Apr 21, 2025; DigiChina, Mar 17, 2026
Diffusion strategy ≠ diffusing well
China’s approach “is partly driven by necessity” -> US controls on Nvidia chips (Chan)
Ding predates AI+ plan · application here = ours
Ding, Review of International Political Economy, 2024; Chan, Brookings, Mar 9, 2026
Assigned sides: left half = yes · right half = no
Argue assigned side, not own view · written answers welcome
The US lever acts on the input where it leads most.
Value added by region, 2022 · one European firm: 87% of lithography market
SIA and BCG, May 2024; Counterpoint Research (HBM), Q2 2026
Control a central network node
Cases: SWIFT, internet -> chips?
Farrell and Newman, International Security, 2019 (today’s reading)
Oct 7, 2022
advanced computing and chip-equipment rules
Oct 17, 2023
rules tightened (effective Nov 17)
Dec 2, 2024
high-bandwidth memory, equipment, Entity List additions
Jan 13, 2025
AI Diffusion Rule (published Jan 15)
Bureau of Industry and Security; Federal Register
Apr 2025
licence required: Nvidia H20
May 13, 2025
Diffusion Rule rescinded
Aug 2025
reported deal: 15% revenue share, H20 sales to China
Jan 2026
H200 licences case by case · cap 50% of US shipments · US testing · 25% import tariff
Blackwell
still presumption of denial
15% deal: reported, never a published rule · 25% = tariff on chips entering US for testing
BIS, May 13, 2025 and Jan 13, 2026; White House fact sheet, Jan 14, 2026; Nvidia filings
US advantage, AI compute produced in 2026
Think-tank model · range depends on export volume + FP4/FP8 assumptions
Institute for Progress (IFP), Dec 7, 2025
“a hardware lead of around 4 years when it comes to training frontier models”
“essentially no lead when it comes to serving those models to users”
No peer-reviewed causal estimate found: export controls -> Chinese model capability
Erdil: author’s views · our search (Nov 2026): not systematic
Erdil, Epoch AI Gradient Updates, Dec 6, 2024
Est. 290,000–1.6M H100-equivalents smuggled to China through 2025 · median 660,000 ≈ ⅓ of China’s compute
Indictments + complaints = allegations · only Hsu, Hao Global pleaded guilty
Epoch AI, Apr 29, 2026; DOJ, Dec 8, 2025; SDNY, Mar 19, 2026
Chinese firms rent Nvidia capacity in SE Asian data centers -> legal under current US law
Remote Access Security Act: passed House -> stuck in Senate committee
Apr 7, 2025
introduced
Apr 9, 2025
committee 51–0
Jan 12, 2026
House 369–22
Jan 13, 2026
referred to Senate Banking
Status as of Nov 7, 2026 · not law
Tan, Carnegie Endowment, May 5, 2026; Congress.gov
Distillation: training on a rival model’s outputs
Govt attribution + company allegations, not court findings · Anthropic’s figures = its own
NSA, CISA and FBI, advisory AA26-251A, Sep 8, 2026; Anthropic, Feb 23, 2026
Jan 29, 2026: jury convicts ex-Google engineer Linwei Ding: economic espionage + AI trade-secret theft
One case · judge: insufficient evidence he meant to benefit PRC govt
DOJ, Jan 30, 2026; KQED, Sep 1, 2026
$16B+ H20 orders
$16B Nvidia H20 orders, 3 Chinese firms (reported, Apr 2025)
Huawei stockpiled chip dies + high-bandwidth memory around Dec 2024 controls
Order figure first reported by The Information.
IFP, Apr 15, 2025
| Controls spur the target | Controls slow the target |
|---|---|
| Hit firms “respond disproportionately by investing in research and development” (Clayton et al. 2025) | China’s chip-equipment localization “predated any modern effort to impose meaningful export controls” (Allen 2024) |
| Controls “can at best slow and disrupt Chinese efforts, not stop them” (Allen 2025) |
Clayton et al.: NBER working paper.
Clayton, Coppola, Maggiori and Schreger, NBER, Jul 2025; Allen, CSIS, Nov 26, 2024 and Mar 7, 2025
US suppliers: −$130B market value after Entity List additions, 2010–22
“In China, we have now dropped to zero.” “…already largely backfired.” Jensen Huang, Nvidia, May 2026
Allies: Dutch licence rules widened (Sep 2024, Apr 2025); Nexperia dispute (Sep–Nov 2025)
NY Fed: Entity List additions 2010–22, not AI-chip rules · “zero” = Nvidia’s share of China’s AI-accelerator market
Crosignani et al., NY Fed Staff Report 1096, 2025; Tom’s Hardware, May 3, 2026; Government of the Netherlands
Export curbs: gallium, germanium, antimony -> US (Dec 2024) · rare earths (Apr + Oct 2025)
Antitrust: preliminary finding vs Nvidia (Sep 2025)
Customs: H200s “not permitted to enter China” (Jan 2026) · ~600,000 reportedly waiting in Hong Kong (Nov 5, 2026)
Customs + Hong Kong reports: anonymous sources (Reuters) · unconfirmed by Nvidia or Beijing
MOFCOM announcements; CNBC, Sep 15, 2025; Reuters, Jan 15 and Nov 5, 2026
“Each side’s attempt to become safer makes others feel less secure, driving further escalation.” Farrell, Newman and Tan
Who writes the technical standards?
Nov 10
Tomorrow: China’s rare-earth curb suspension expires · wider truce -> Jan 10, 2027
No MOFCOM extension of Nov 10 date, as of Nov 7, 2026
Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2026; Texas National Security Review, Sep 2025; MOFCOM Announcement 2025 No. 70; MOFCOM readout, Sep 28, 2026
Back to the start: ahead at what?
Implementation Milestone · Sun, Nov 15, 11:59 p.m. · 800–1,000 words
Wednesday, Nov 11: Agentic AI: From Chatbots to Agents · Yiqing Xu
Next Monday, Nov 16: AI Sovereignty
Stanford University · POLISCI 158